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I. INTRODUCTION
To facilitate the special educational needs of handicapped" children,2 Con-
gress enacted the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 19751
(EAHCA) which provides federal funds to encourage states to educate their
handicapped children. States which accept federal funding must formulate
a plan that assures that "all handicapped children have available to
them . . . a free appropriate public education."4
I A handicapped child "deviates from the average or normal child (1) in men-
tal characteristics, (2) in sensory abilities, (3) in neuromuscular or physical
characteristics, (4) in social or emotional behavior, (5) in communication abilities,
or (6) in multiple handicaps to such an extent" that his school program or special
educational services must be modified for him to maximize his potential. S. KINK,
EDUCATING EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 4 (2d ed. 1972). See infra note 34. While the
handicapped child may not derive any benefits if kept isolated, he can learn if pro-
vided with "a structured program of education." GILHOOL, EDUCATION, AN IN-
ALIENABLE RIGHT 597, 603 (1973).
2 The EAHCA dictates that states provide a "free appropriate public educa-
tion" to all handicapped children between the ages of five and eighteen. Further-
more, if states provide an education to nonhandicapped children aged three to five
and aged eighteen to twenty-one, then these states must educate handicapped
children of the same age. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(B) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.122 (1988).
' Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 774 (1975) (amending Pub. L. No. 91-230, § 601,
84 Stat. 175 (1970) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982 & Supp.
V 1987) ). Some courts and commentators refer to the statute as the Education of
the Handicapped Act (EHA). Regulations published pursuant to the EAHCA are
found in 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-300.754 (1988) (previously found in 45 C.F.R.
§§ 121a.1-121a.754). Handicapped children may also utilize 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982
& Supp. V 1987) (Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973), 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1982 & Supp. V 1987) (the Civil Rights Act of 1971), and the Equal Protection
and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide further relief
from inaccurate and often erroneous special education placements. This Note
discusses the EACHA as a source of relief for providing autistic children with a
free appropriate public education, however, it should be noted that the United States
Supreme Court concluded "that where the [EAHCA] is available to a handicapped
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Complying states must establish and maintain procedures that
guarantee due process safeguards 5 to the handicapped child and to her
parents or guardians. These protections include the right to receive writ-
ten notice before a change in the child's educational placement,' the right
to present complaints regarding the appropriateness of placement, 7 the
child asserting a right to a free appropriate public education, based either on the
[EAHCA] or on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the[EAHCA] is the exclusive avenue through which the child and his parents or guard-
ian can pursue their claim." Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1013 (1984).
4 20 U.S.C. § 1400(C) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The EAHCA defines a "free ap-
propriate" public education as:
[Sipecial education and related services which (A) have been provided
at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and without
charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency, (C) in-
clude an appropriate preschool, elementary, or secondary school educa-
tion in the state involved, and (D) are provided in conformity with the
individualized education program required.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
' See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 34 C.F.R.
§§ 300.500-300.589 (1988).
6 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (bX1XC) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 34 C.F.R. § 300.504(a) (1988).
Parents of a handicapped child must receive prior written notice whenever the
school "proposes to initiate or change, or refuses to initiate or change, the iden-
tification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child or the provision of a
free appropriate public education to the child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (bX1XC) (1982
& Supp. V 1987). See infra note 43.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has defined a change
in educational placement as "any significant alterations in the programs, activities,
or services provided by [schools] to handicapped children ... includ[ing] changes
in the degree to which handicapped children are integrated with nonhandicapped
children in these programs and activities." Concerned Parents v. New York City
Bd. of Ed., 629 F.2d 751, 752-53 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1078 (1981).
Several courts have interpreted a change in educational placement to include ex-
pulsion from schools. See S-1 v. Turlington, 635 F.2d 342 (5th. Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1030 (1981); Kaelin v. Grubbs, 682 F.2d 595 (6th Cir. 1982); Doe v. Koger,
480 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Ind. 1979); Stuart v. Nappi, 443 F. Supp. 1235 (D. Conn.
1978); Board of Ed. of City of Peoria v. Illinois State Bd. of Ed., 531 F. Supp. 148
(C.D. Ill. 1982) (one week suspension did not constitute a change in educational
placement).
The complaint may concern any aspect of the child's identification, evalua-
tion, or educational placement. 20.U.S.C. § 1415 (b)(1E) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
See infra note 43. One writer suggests that the EAHCA's failure to limit the per-
sons who may complain to the Commissioner or State agency presumably permits
anyone to make a report. Krass, The Right to Public Education for Handicapped
Children: A Primer for the New Advocate, 1976 U. ILL. L. F. 1016, 1072. Krass'
interpretation furthers the EAHCA's purpose of providing handicapped children
with an appropriate education. To read into the omission that only parents can
present complaints would hinder the EAHCA's aim.
Knowing that interested parties have the right to present complaints might
cause a school to comply with the law. A "watchdog" provision could provide a
similar scare tactic. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-76b(d) (West Supp. 1988); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:1944 (B) (8) (West 1977); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20A § 7205
(West 1983); N.Y. ED. LAW 4403(4) (McKinney 1987) (state education department
has the power and the duty to make periodic inspections of special education pro-
grams and facilities and to report on whether the services are adequate).
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right to have an impartial hearing' if the placement is in dispute, 9 the right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing,'0 and the right to appeal the
decision made in the hearing and bring a civil action."
Autistic children are handicapped children within the meaning of the
EAHCA, therefore, they are entitled to receive "free appropriate public
education." This Note will discuss whether Ohio currently provides autistic
children a "free appropriate public education" in accordance with the
EAHCA. Ohio's parallel statute, the State Education of Handicapped Act' 2
(State Act), is compared to similar legislation currently existing in various
other states throughout the United States. Areas in the State Act needing
clarification are scrutinized and statutory revisions are recommended. This
Note concludes that Ohio should adopt additional safeguards to ensure that
autistic children receive a "free appropriate public education."
II. AUTISM DEFINED
Autism is a severe and incapacitating developmental neurological
disability that usually appears during the first three years of life.'3 It oc-
curs in approximately fifteen out of every 10,000 births.' 4 Out of the near-
ly 3.75 million births recorded in the United States each year, 5,625
children are born with autism.' 5 Also, autism is four times more common
in boys than in girls and is found throughout the world in families of all
racial, ethnic, and social backgrounds.'"
Dr. Bernard Rimland,' 7 a recognized authority on the treatment of
autistic and hyperactive children, describes this disorder as:
I The EAHCA provides parents with the opportunity for an impartial due pro-
cess hearing. To ensure the hearing officer's impartiality, the EAHCA stipulates
that hearings may not be conducted by employees of the school involved in the
child's education or care. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(bX2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 34 C.F.R.
§ 300.506 (1988). See infra note 43.
9 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (bX2) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 34 C.F.R. § 300.506-300.510
(1988). See infra note 43.
10 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (d) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 34 C.F.R. § 300.508 (aX) (1987).
See infra note 44.
" 20. U.S.C. § 1415 (e) (1982 & Supp. V 1987); 34 C.F.R., §§ 300.510-300.511
(1988). See infra note 45.
2 OmIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3323.01-3323.16 (Baldwin 1976).
"Autism Society of America, 19 ADVOCATE No. 4, at 23 (1987) (hereinafter
ADVOCATE).
1" Id. at 10. To get an idea of the autistic population, one can calculate, based
on 15 in every 10,000 that there are approximately 300,000 people (children and
adults) with autism and related communications handicaps in this country.
15 Id.
's Id. at 23.
" Rimland, On Autism: An Interview, Institute for Child Research Behavior.
Dr. Rimland is the Director of the Institute for Child Behavior Research in San
Diego, California.
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[A] very severe behavioral disorder of childhood, which in
most cases starts at birth, or soon after birth, and presents a
major handicap to the individual for his or her entire life,
although there have been a few unexpected cases of at least par-
tial recovery. Autistic children are generally very well formed
and physically attractive. Their disorder is difficult to
characterize, but a very prominent feature is their inability to
relate to or communicate with other human beings in ways that
are natural or meaningful. Some autistic are mute and others
do have speech, but it is usually of a rather bizarre, ritualistic
type, which is not very will suited to communication.
An autistic child has been described as living in a dream
world, in a glass ball, or in a world of his own. The cause is
unknown, although it is known that the old fashioned idea that
autism was an emotional disorder is entirely incorrect. It is well
known that autism is brought about by some metabolic dysfunc-
tion of the brain, but beyond that, the cause is not known.18
Caused by physical disorders of the brain, the usual symptoms of autism
include: the inability to process external information which leads to pro-
blems in learning, communication, and behavior;19 disturbances in the rate
of appearance of physical, social, and language skills; abnormal responses
to sensations;"0 and abnormal ways of relating to people, objects, and
events.21
Typically, autistic children resist change and frequently immerse
themselves in self-stimulating activities like rocking and hand-flapping.
An autistic child can be erratic, hyperactive, self-destructive or totally
withdrawn. Speech and language are generally lacking or lagging. Many
autistic children also have other handicaps.22
Autism is frequently confused with, but greatly differs from mental
retardation. Distinctive and specific thinking capabilities may be present
in autistic children which do not exist in mentally retarded children.23
Oftentimes, people with autism marginally function in society. Appropriate
education can enable autistic children to become functioning citizens rather
than institutionalized beings.
2 4
18 Id.
19Lundberg, New Hope for Autistic Children, Boston Globe, Aug. 24, 1986, at
84, 86, col. 1.
20 Any one or a combination of senses or responses are influenced: sight, hear-
ing, touch, balance, smell, taste, reaction of pain, and the way a child holds his
or her body. ADVOCATE, supra note 13, at 24.
21 Id.
Lundberg, supra note 19, at 88.
23 It is important to distinguish autism from retardation or mental disorders
since diagnostic confusion may potentially result in inappropriate and ineffective
treatment techniques. ADVOCATE, supra note 13, at 24.
24 F. Warren, Future Directions in Educational Planning: The Problem is the
Problem, and It's Real, in CRTICAL ISSUES IN EDUCATING AUTISTIC CHILDREN AND
YOUTH 286, 287 (Wilcox & Thompson eds. 1986) (in reference to the results of a
study funded by HEW (now Health and Human Services) and conducted by R.
Sullivan in 1977).
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Research has established that the most beneficial treatment for autistic
children is a firmly structured, purposeful educational program.2" Accord-
ing to Dr. Rimland, autistic children generally have a limited degree of
understanding and the type of teaching which is most effective is behavior
modification.2" Psychotherapy and psychoanalysis were at one time the
principle methods of treating autistic children, however, today, these
methods do much more harm than good."
Since 1943, autism has existed as a distinct classification of childhood
disorders. 8 The initial perception of autism as an emotional disturbance
25 Rimland, supra note 17.
26 Behavior modification involves the use of rewards and sometimes mild
punishments. It is the method by which Helen Keller was taught. Rimland, supra
note 17. Normal people and non-autistic retarded people develop a system of inter-
nalized ideas that act as a guide for conduct in diverse situations. Due to their
impairments, autistic and autistic-like people have no organized system of either
thinking about past events, or interpreting the present and planning for the future.
They cannot create this inner world of thoughts and ideas. Consequently, to educate
an autistic person, structure and organization must be provided from the outside.
CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 24, at 292-93 (describing three features of autism set
forth by L. Wing, Diagnosing Autism and Autistic-Like Conditions in an address
to the National Society for Autistic Children, San Jose, Cal. 1979).
Another useful treatment for autism is the use of high dosage levels (usually
350 mg. to 1000 mg. per day) of vitamin B6, along with Recommended Daily
Allowance levels of the mineral magnesium. Although it is recommended that B6
be combined with other B vitamins, research done by the Institute of Child Behavior
Research, as well as by a number of other researchers in the United States and
abroad, has demonstrated that 30% to 60% of autistic children show significant
behavioral and other benefits after the administration of the B6 and magnesium.
According to Dr. Rimland:
[Tithe studies have used not only behavioral measures to determine
whether or not the children have improved, but also in some cases brain
wave analysis and urine studies have been applied to groups of autistic
children before and after treatment with the vitamin B6, and the B6
brings about improvements as measured in all three of these criteria.
Rimland, supra note 17.
27 Rimland, supra note 17.
28 The term autism was first used by Dr. Leo Kanner of Johns Hopkins School
of Medicine in 1943 to describe eleven children with the following behavioral
characteristics: (1) inability to develop relationships with people, (2) delay in speech
acquisition, (3) non-communicative use of speech after it develops, (4) delayed
echolalia, (5) pronoun reversal, (6) repetitive and stereotyped play activities, (7)
an obsessive insistence on the maintenance of sameness, (8) lack of imagination,
(9) a good rote memory, and (10) a normal physical appearance. Kanner, Autistic
Disturbances of Affective Contact, 2 Nervous Child 217, 217-50 (1943). "The use
of the term 'autism' to describe children with these characteristics was perhaps
an unfortunate choice because it was immediately confused with Bleuler's (1911)
use of the same word to describe an active withdrawal into fantasy shown by pa-
tients with schizophrenia." CRITICAL ISSUES, supra note 24, at 288 (referring to a
study by E. Bleuler, Demantia Praecox Oder Gruppe Der Schizophrenien (1911)
(Translated by J. Zinkim 1950)).
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has been discarded by virtually all professionals. Most states, however,
continue to administer educational services for autistic children under the
emotionally handicapped grouping.29 Consequently, the administrative
structure has had the effect of perpetuating the obsolete version of autism.
Funds designated for the education of emotionally disturbed children
do not provide adequate services for autistic children. Dr. Leo Kanner's
original description of autism evidenced that autistic children "are all un-
questionably endowed with good cognitive potentialities. '"0 A broader con-
ception of autism, however, has evolved since 1943 which has consequent-
ly changed Kanner's initial description of autism.
In the past, most autistic children were generally considered to be
severely handicapped, functioning at moderately to severely retarded
levels. As funds and services for severely handicapped children became
more widely available throughout the 1970's, many educators and
legislators assumed that autistic children were being served under this
designation. Parents of autistic children, however, believe that their
children have been left out of or have been inadequately served in both
the emotionally disturbed and the severely handicapped programs. The
establishment of a new educational category of autism is necessary.3 1
The immediate advantage of using autism as a classification for educa-
tion planning would emphasize the needs of a group of children who have
been inadequately served in the past and would further result in funds
specifically channeled for services to autistic children. More accurate data
on the number of autistic children being served could then be collected
29 See, e.g., Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 5126.01(FX1X2) (Baldwin 1980) which defines
developmentally disabled as:
[Hiaving a disability that originates before age eighteen, has continued
or can be expected to continue indefinitely, and constitutes a substan-
tial handicap to the person's ability to function normally in society,
and is attributable to one of the following: (1) Mental retardation,
cerebral palsy, the epilepsies, or autism; (2) Any other condition found
to be closely related to mental retardation because it results in impair-
ment of general intellectual functioning or adaptive behavior similar
to that of mentally retarded persons or requires treatment and services
similar to those required for such persons.
30 Kanner, supra note 28, at 47.
31 The National Society for Autistic Children proposed the creation of a separate
educational category for "autistic and related communications handicaps." CRmcAL
ISSUES, supra note 24, at 295. A difficulty, however, exists regarding categorization:
With categories, children have been labeled, stigmatized, rejected, in-
stitutionalized and, in the extreme, killed by harsh environmental con-
ditions found in various 'asylums,' conditions created as a result of
societal rejection and neglect. Documentation of the harm that can
result from labeling is extensive. Without categories, children have been
overlooked, ignored, rejected, endlessly assessed and diagnosed, but
unserved. They and their parents have wandered from one rejection
to another until they grew old. Many have found no place where their
problem could be addressed, because it was undefined, confusing, and
presented unknown qualities. No category meant no recognition, no
advocates, no program, and no funding.
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by state agencies and used to both encourage and promote the training
of teachers, school psychologists, speech pathologists, and other necessary
related personnel. Moreover, the stigma associated with the emotionally
disturbed would be removed, thereby freeing autistic children of an un-
true and unnecessary stereotype.32
III. THE EAHCA
The Education for All Handicapped Children Act33 was enacted to
"assure that all handicapped children 34 have available to them a . . . free
appropriate public education."3 Under the EAHCA, a state may receive
federal funds for educating handicapped children only if the state
demonstrates that it "has in effect a policy that assures all handicapped
children the right to a free appropriate education."36
States are obligated to ensure that educational agencies provide pro-
cedures to refer and evaluate 37 all children thought to have a handicap.
Each child who is identified as handicapped through this procedure must
32 Id.
11 The EAHCA became effective on October 1, 1977. See 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (1976
& Supp. 1989). For the history and background which led to the adoption of the
EAHCA, see PLACING CHILDREN IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: A STRATEGY FOR EQUITY
23 (K. Heller, W. Holtzman & S. Messick eds. 1982); Lazerson, The Origins of Special
Education in SPECIAL EDUCATION POLICIES: THEIR HISTORY, IMPLEMENTATION AND
FINANCE 15 (J. Chambers & W. Hartman eds. 1983); Colley, The Education for All
Handicapped Children Act (EHA): A Statutory and Legal Analysis, 10 J. L. & EDUC.
137 (1981); Herr, Retarded Children and the Law: Enforcing the Constitutional
Rights of the Mentally Retarded, 23 SYRACUSE L. REV. 995 (1972); Note, The Right
of Handicapped Children to an Education: The Phoenix of Rodriguez, 59 CORNELL
L. REV. 519 (1974); Note, Enforcing the Right to an "Appropriate" Education: The
Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 92 H~Av. L. REV. 1103 (1979);
Note, The Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, U. MICH. J. L. REF.
110 (1976).
14 The EAHCA defines "handicapped children" as children who are "mentally
retarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech or language impaired, visually handicapped,
seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, or other health impaired
children, or children with specific learning disabilities, who by reason thereof re-
quire special education and related services." 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1) (1975 & Supp.
1987).
35 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (1982). See supra note 4.
3r6 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1) (1976).
" A state applying for EAHCA funds must show to the Secretary of Education
that:
[A]ll children residing in the State who are handicapped, regardless
of the severity of their handicap, and who are in need of special educa-
tion and related services are identified, located, and evaluated, and that
a practical method is developed and implemented to determine which
children are currently receiving needed special education and related
services.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(2XC) (1976 & Supp. 1987); 34 C.F.R. § 300.4 (1988). Local educa-
tion agencies or intermediate education units must submit applications for funds
to the states which similarly confirm that proper referral and evaluation procedures
are situated. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(AX1Xa) (1976 & Supp. 1987).
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then receive an Individualized Education Program (IEP) 8 which, among
other things, details the specific educational services, the duration of the
services, and the instructional setting that the child will receive.3 9 The
IEP is formulated at a meeting attended by a qualified education agency
representative (such as a psychologist, principal, or counselor), the child's
teacher, the parents or guardian, and occasionally the child.40 Furthermore,
children identified as handicapped before the enactment of the EAHCA
must also receive an IEP which must be periodically reviewed and revised
as required.
4 1
Complying states must establish and maintain procedures which
guarantee due process safeguards to the handicapped child and to her
parents.42 Parents and guardians who oppose the child's proposed place-
ment may file a complaint and obtain an impartial due process hearing
conducted by the state or local education agency.43 Any party aggrieved
3 The EAHC defines the IEP as:
[A] written statement for each handicapped child developed in any
meeting by a representative of the local educational agency or an in-
termediate educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or super-
vise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the uni-
que needs of handicapped children, the teacher, the parents or guar-
dian of such child, and, whenever appropriate, such child, which state-
ment shall include (A) a statement of the present levels of educational
performance of such child, (B) a statement of annual goals, including
short-term instructional objectives, (C) a statement of the specific educa-
tional services to be provided to such child, and the extent to which
such child will be able to participate in regular educational programs,
(D) the projected date for initiation and anticipated duration of such
services, and (E) appropriate objective criteria and evaluation pro-
cedures and schedules for determining, on at least an annual basis,
whether instructional objectives are being achieved.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(19) (1976 & Supp. 1987).
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a) (5) (1976 & Supp. 1987).
42 Compliance is assured by provisions permitting the withholding of federal
funds upon determination that a participating state or local agency has failed to
satisfy the requirements of the EAHCA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(bX2XA), 1416 (1976
& Supp. 1987), and by the provision for judicial review. Presently, all states ex-
cept New Mexico receive federal funds under the EAHCA.
41 The EAHCA dictates that each local education agency shall provide:
(1XA) an opportunity for the parents or guardian of a handicapped child
to examine all relevant records with respect to the identification, evalua-
tion, and educational placement of the child, and the provision of a free
appropriate public education to such child, and to obtain an independ-
ent evaluation of the child;
(B) procedures to protect the rights of the child whenever the parents
or guardian of the child are not known, unavailable, or the child is a
ward of the State, including the assignment of an individual (who shall
not be an employee of the State educational agency, local educational
agency, or intermediate educational unit involved in the education or
care of the child) to act as a surrogate for the parents or guardian;
(C) written prior notice to the parents or guardian of the child
whenever such agency or unit-
(i) proposes to initiate or change, or
[Vol. 3:1
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by the findings and decision of the hearing may appeal to the state educa-
tion agency for an impartial review.4 4 The law grants parties the right to
have counsel and specialists in education of the handicapped present, the
right to present evidence, the right to confront, cross-examine, and com-
pel the attendance of witnesses, the right to a written or electronic ver-
batim record of such hearing, and the right to written findings of fact and
decision."5
Furthermore, if the parents or school district are still aggrieved by the
decision after the appeal, they may file a civil action in any state court
of competent jurisdiction or in a federal district court without regard to
the amount in controversy." The court shall then review the administrative
(ii) refuses to initiate or change, the identification, evaluation,
or educational placement of the child or the provision of a
free appropriate public education to the child;
(D) procedures designed to assure that the notice required by clause (C) fully
inform the parents or guardian in the parents' or guardian's native language, unless
it clearly is not feasible to do so, of all procedures available pursuant to this sec-
tion; and
(E) an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating
to the identification, evaluation, or educational placement of the child, or the pro-
vision of a free appropriate public education to such child.
(2) Whenever a complaint has been received under paragraph (1) of this
subsection, the parents or guardian shall have an opportunity for an impartial due
process hearing which shall be conducted by the State educational agency or by
the local educational agency or intermediate educational unit, as determined by
State law or by the State educational agency. No hearing conducted pursuant to
the requirements of this paragraph shall be conducted by an employee of such agen-
cy or unit involved in the education or care of the child.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(b) (1975).
The due process hearing must occur within 45 days of the hearing request. 34
C.F.R. § 300.512(a) (1987). Either party may request that the hearing officer grant
a specific extension beyond the 45 day period. 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(c) (1987). The
hearing must be conducted at a time and place reasonably convenient for the parents
and child. 34 C.F.R. § 300.512(d) (1987).
"When a local decision is reviewed by a state educational agency, federal law
requires that:
(c) If the hearing in paragraph (2) of subsection (b) of this section is con-
ducted by a local educational agency or an intermediate educational
unit, any party aggrieved by the findings and decision rendered in such
a hearing may appeal to the State educational agency which shall con-
duct an impartial review of such hearing. The officer conducting such
review shall make an independent decision upon completion of such
review.
20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) (1976).
45 20 U.S.C. § 1415(d) (1976 & Supp. 1987).
46 20 U.S.C. § 1415(eX2) (1976 & Supp. 1987). The EAHCA also requires that:
During the pendency of any proceedings conducted pursuant to this
section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents
or guardian otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then cur-
rent educational placement of such child, or, if applying for initial ad-
mission to a public school, shall, with the consent of the parents or
guardian, be placed in the public school program until all such pro-
ceedings have been completed.
20 U.S.C.§ 1415(eX3) (1976 & Supp. 1987).
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record, may hear additional evidence at the request of either party and,
using a preponderance of the evidence standard, "shall grant such relief
as the court determines is appropriate."47
IV. Board of Education v. Rowley
The United States Supreme Court considered the meaning of the
statutory term "free appropriate public education"4 8 in Board of Educa-
tion v. Rowley, 49 the first case in which the Court interpreted any provi-
sion of the EAHCA. In Rowley, the Court focused substantial attention
on Congress' intent encompassing the background, formulation, and enact-
ment of the EAHCA. The Court held that the EAHCA requires that a par-
ticipating state provide personalized instruction and related support ser-
vices.5 °
The EAHCA legislation was enacted in response to Congress' percep-
tion that a majority of handicapped children in the United States "were
either totally excluded from schools or [were] sitting idly in regular
classrooms awaiting the time that they were old enough to 'drop out'."51 In
41 Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision made under subsection (b)
of this section, who does not have the right to an appeal under subsection (c) of
this section, and any party aggrieved by the findings and decision under subsec-
tion (c) of this section, shall have the right to bring a civil action with respect to
the complaint presented pursuant to this section, which action may be brought
in any State court without regard to the amount in controversy. In any action
brought under this paragraph the court shall receive the records of the ad-
ministrative proceedings, shall hear additional evidence, shall grant such relief
as the court determines is appropriate. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(eX2) (1976 & Supp. 1987).
48 In cases brought under the EAHCA, perhaps the most difficult task confron-
ting judges and administrative hearing officers has been interpretation and ap-
plication of the requirement that the education of each handicapped child be "ap-
propriate." See, e.g., Colin v. Schmidt, 536 F. Supp. 1375 (D.R.I. 1982), affd, 715
F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1983); Campbell v. Talladeger County Bd. of Educ., 518 F. Supp.
47 (N.D.Ala. 1981); Noeris v. Massachusetts Dep't of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 759
(D.Mass. 1981); Buchholtz v. Iowa Dep't of Pub. Instruction, 315 N.W.2d 789 (Iowa
1982); Shanberg v. Pennsylvania, 57 Pa. Commw. 384, 426 A.2d 232 (1981).
49 458 U.S. 176 (1982).
1o Id. at 203. In particular, the Rowley court concluded that the EAHCA did
not obligate the state of New York to provide a sign language interpreter to assist
a deaf child who had progressed easily from grade to grade, but was not learning
as much as she would with the interpreter's assistance. Id. at 185-86. The Court
limited its holding to the facts of the case and found Amy Rowley's academic prog-
ress, considered in light of the special services and "professional considerations"
afforded by the school administrators, to be dispositive. Id. at 203 n. 25. For a com-
plete discussion of Rowley, see Zirkel, Building an Appropriate Education from
Board of Education v. Rowley: Razing the Door and Raising the Floor, 42 MD. L.
REV. 466 (1983); Comment, Board of Education v. Rowley: Handicapped Children
are Entitled to a Beneficial Education, 69 IowA L. REV. 23 (1983).
"' Rowley, 458 U.S. at 179 (citations omitted). The Court in Rowley discussed
the events and legislative enactments preceeding Congressional adoption of the
EAHCA. Id. at 179-80.
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Rowley, the Court considered two questions: What is meant by the
EAHCA's requirement of a "free appropriate public education"; and, what
is the role of state and federal courts in exercising the review granted by
the EAHCA.5"
The EAHCA defines "free appropriate public education":
The term 'free appropriate public education' means special
education and related service which (A) have been provided at
public expense, under public supervision and direction, and
without charge, (B) meet the standards of the State educational
agency, (C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary, or
secondary school education in the State involved, and (D) are
provided in conformity with the individualized education pro-
gram required under section 1414(aX5) of this title."3
"Special education" under the EAHCA means "specially designed instruc-
tion, at no cost to parents or guardians, to meet the unique needs of a han-
dicapped child, including classroom instruction, instruction in physical
education, home instruction, and instruction in hospitals and institu-
tions. ' -" "Related services" are defined as "transportation, and such
developmental, corrective, and other supportive services ... as may be
required to assist a handicapped child to benefit from special education."55
The Supreme Court noted that "[b]y passing the EAHCA, Congress
sought primarily to make public education available to handicapped
children."' 6 Congress expressly "recognize[d] that in many instances the
process of providing special education and related services to handicap-
ped children is not guaranteed to produce any particular outcome."5
The Supreme Court further commented that the intent of the EAHCA
was "more to open the door of public education to handicapped children
on appropriate terms than to guarantee any particular level of education
once inside. ' 58 Moreover, under the EAHCA "Congress sought primarily
to identify and evaluate handicapped children, and to provide them with
access to a free public education."5 9 The Court concluded "that the 'basic
52 Id. at 186.
53 20 U.S.C. § 1401(18) (1976 & Supp. 1987). See supra note 4.
54 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16) (1976 & Supp. 1987); 34 C.F.R. § 300.12 (1987). See
also Parks v. Pavkovic, 536 F. Supp. 296 (N.D. Ill. 1982), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 753 F.2d 1397 (7th Cir. 1985) (definition of "free education"); R. MARTIN,
EDUCATING HANDICAPPED CHILDREN: THE LEGAL MANDATE 57 (1979) (interpretation
of "appropriate").
55 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1976 & Supp. 1987). Examples of "related services"
identified in the EAHCA are "speech pathology and audiology, psychological ser-
vices, physical and occupational therapy, recreation, and medical and counseling
services, except that such medical services shall be for diagnostic and evaluation
purposes only." Id.
56 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192.
" S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 1975 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 1425, 1435.
" Rowley, 458 U.S. at 192.
" Id. at 200.
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floor of opportunity' provided by the [EAHCA] consists of access to special-
ized instruction and related services which are individually designed to
provide educational benefit to the handicapped child." 0
An appropriate education is provided when personalized education ser-
vices are furnished. The Supreme Court declared: "the requirement that
a state provide specialized educational services to handicapped children
generates no additional requirement that the services so provided be suf-
ficient to maximize each child's potential 'commensurate with the oppor-
tunity provided other children'." 1 The EAHCA mandates that par-
ticipating states educate handicapped children with nonhandicapped
children whenever possible.6 2 When the "mainstreaming"8 3 preference of
the EAHCA is met and a child is being educated in the regular classrooms
of a public school system, the school system still must monitor the educa-
tional progress of the child."
60 Id. at 201. Another important goal of the EAHCA is to reduce costs to the
government and taxpayers by helping handicapped people become self-sufficient.
In Kruelle v. New Castle County School Dist., 642 F.2d 687, 691 (3d Cir. 1981)
the court noted:
A cost-benefit philosophy supported these interlocking goals. Instead
of saddling public agencies and taxpayers with the enormous expend-
itures necessary to maintain the handicapped as lifelong dependents
in a minimally acceptable institutionalized existence, Congress rea-
soned that the early injection of federal money and provision of educa-
tional services would remove this burden by creating productive
citizens.
61 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 198.
62 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1976 & Supp. 1987) requires that participating states
establish:
Procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handi-
capped children, including children in public or private institutions or
other care facilities, are educated with children who are not handi-
capped, and that special classes, separate schooling, or other removal
of handicapped children from the regular educational environment oc-
curs only when the nature or severity of the handicap is such that educa-
tion in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services
cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
The mainstreaming requirement provides that an appropriate education take
place in the "least restrictive environment." The state must adopt "procedures
to assure that, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped children ... are
educated with children who are not handicapped." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5)(B) (1975
& Supp. 1987). Any other alternative may be seen as "restrictive." A restrictive
environment limits the way teachers and students view the child and could injure
the child's chances of becoming self-sufficient. See R. MARTIN, supra note 54, at
85. Mainstreaming is a response to the practice of placing handicapped children
in institutions. Many schools did not favor having "slow" children in their
classrooms. The integration of handicapped children into the regular classroom
has been proven to substantially improve their performance. See S. KmK, supra
note 1, at 199-201. As a result, separate schooling is to be considered only as a
last resort for the severely handicapped child.
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203. The Court further noted that customary exams,
grades, and yearly advancement to the next grade is permitted for children who
achieve an adequate knowledge of the course material. Those who graduate from
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A state satisfies the EAHCA's requirement of providing a handicap-
ped child a "free appropriate public education" by furnishing personaliz-
ed instruction with suitable support services which allows the child to
benefit educationally from such instruction. The Supreme Court further
emphasized that:
Such instruction and services must be provided at public ex-
pense, must meet the State's educational standards, must ap-
proximate the grade levels used in the State's regular educa-
tion, and must comport with the child's IEP. In addition, the
IEP, and therefore the personalized instruction, should be for-
mulated with the requirements of the [EAHCA] and, if the child
is being educated in the regular classrooms of the public educa-
tion system, should be reasonably calculated to enable the child
to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.1
5
The second question the Supreme Court addresses in Rowley pertains
to the role of state and federal courts in exercising the review granted by
the EAHCA. The scope of judicial review in cases brought under the
EAHCA involves a two-part inquiry. First, the court will inquire as to
whether the State has complied with the procedures set forth in the
EAHCA"6 and, secondly, whether the individualized educational program
developed through the EAHCA's procedures is reasonably calculated to
enable the child to receive educational benefits.67
In making these determinations, a court must make an independent
review of the evidence, but in doing so it must give "due weight" to the
expertise of the school officials responsible for the child's education." Then,
"basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence," the court "shall
grant such relief as [it] determines is appropriate."6 9 If the State satisfies
the inquiry's requirements, it has followed the obligations enacted by Con-
gress, thereafter the courts may not compel more.
Additionally, once a court ascertains that the requirements of the
EAHCA have been met, questions of methodology are to be resolved by
the States. The EAHCA grants states and local educational agencies the
responsibility of formulating a handicapped child's education and select-
ing the educational method most suitable to the child's individual needs.
public school systems are deemed "educated" by society; access to an "education"
is specifically what Congress sought to provide in the EAHCA. Id.
85 Id. at 203-04.
"Id. at 206-07 n.27. The Supreme Court stated that "this inquiry will require
a court not only to satisfy itself that the State has adopted the state plan, policies,
and assurances required by the [EAHCA], but also to determine that the state has
created an IEP for the child in question which conforms with the requirements
of Section 1401(19)." Id.
67 The Supreme Court further noted that "when the handicapped child is be-
ing educated in the regular classrooms of a public school system, the achievement
of passing marks and advancement from grade to grade will be one important fac-
tor in determining educational benefit." Id. at 207 n.28. See supra note 63.
8 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 205-06.
89 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e) (1976 & Supp. 1987).
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The EAHCA explicitly delegates states with the responsibility of "acquir-
ing and disseminating to teachers and administrators of programs for han-
dicapped children significant information derived from educational
research, demonstration, and similar projects, and (B) adopting, where ap-
propriate, promising educational practices and materials."70
The EAHCA's core principles emerged from the decision
intact; Rowley affirmed the rights of handicapped children:
71
(1) to be educated by public schools without charge; 72
(2) to be provided with individualized, beneficial, meaningful ser-
vices designed through the IEP process;
73
(3) to be mainstreamed where possible; 74
(4) to receive an instructional program that approximates the
grade levels used in the state's regular education program; 5
(5) to be provided with related and supportive services needed
to derive benefits from their education;78
(6) to have parents or guardians actively involved in the plan-
ning of their education;
77
(7) to challenge the adequacy of their education programs in due
process hearings;7
(8) to challenge in federal court both the substance of their IEP
and the procedures afforded for its development and review.
79
While state and local educational agencies are primarily responsible
for the formulation and execution of a handicapped child's education, the
EAHCA provides the child with protection. Parental involvement plays
an important role in the development of state plans and policies 0 and in
the formulation of the child's Individual Educational Program."'
70 20 U.S.C. § 1413(aX3) (1976 & Supp. 1987).
71. For a discussion of the effect that the Rowley decision may have had on the
education of all handicapped children, see Beyer, A Free Appropriate Public Educa-
tion, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 363, 382 (1983).
72 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 188, 203.
71 Id. at 203.
7 Id. at 202-03.
75 Id. at 203.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 208-09.
78 Id. at 205-06.
79 Id. at 206-07.
80 See supra note 43.
81 The Senate Report states:
The Committee recognizes that in many instances the process of pro-
viding special education and related services to handicapped children
is not guaranteed to produce any particular outcome. By changing the
language [of the provision relating to individualized educational pro-
grams] to emphasize the process of parent and child involvement and
to provide a written record of reasonable expectations, the Commmit-
tee intends to clarify that such individualized planning conferences are
a way to provide parent involvement and protection to assure that ap-
propriate services are provided to a handicapped child.
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V. CASE LAW
In Burlington School Committee v. Department of Education2 , the
Supreme Court clarified the issue regarding the availability of a reimburse-
ment remedy for costs incurred by parents in educating their handicap-
ped children who did not receive a "free appropriate public education"
under the EAHCA. In Burlington, the Supreme Court held that the authori-
ty granted to a court reviewing a plan under the EAHCA includes the
power to order school authorities to reimburse parents for their expen-
ditures for private special education for a handicapped child if the court
ultimately determines that private placement is proper. The Court fur-
ther held that parental violation of the EAHCA by changing the "then
current educational placement" of the child during pendency proceedings
to review the challenged plan does not constitute a waiver of the parents'
right to reimbursement.8
3
The Court maintained: "We are confident that by empowering the court
to grant 'appropriate' relief Congress meant to include retroactive reim-
bursement to parents as an available remedy in a proper case." The
S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1975). See also S. CoNF. REP. No. 455,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 30, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1483;
34 C.F.R. § 300.345 (1987).
Furthermore, because of Rowley's emphasis on the primary role of local and
state educational agencies on developing and reviewing a child's IEP, advocates
for handicapped children would be well advised to contest inappropriate programs
or an inadequate provision of services at the earliest possible point in the ad-
ministrative process. See generally M. BUDOFF, A. ORENSTEIN & C. KERVICK, DuE
PROCESS IN SPECIAL EDUCATION: ON GOING To A HEARING (1982) [hereinafter Budoff];
B. CUTLER, UNRAVELING THE SPECIAL EDUCATION MAZE: AN ACTION GUIDE FOR
PARENTS (1981).
82 471 U.S. 359 (1985).
83 Id. at 360.
Id. at 370-71. The Court further stated that:
Reimbursement merely requires the Town to belatedly pay expenses
that it should have paid all along and would have borne in the first
instance had it developed a proper IEP. Such a post-hoc determination
of financial responsibility was contemplated in the [EAHCA's]
legislative history:
If a parent contends that he or she has been forced, at that parent's
own expense, to seek private schooling for the child because an ap-
propriate program does not exist within the local educational agency
responsible for the child's education and the local educational agency
disagrees, that disagreement and the question of who remains finan-
cially responsible is a matter to which the due process procedures
established under [the predecessor to Section 1415] appl[y].
S. REP. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 32, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 1425, 1456, (quoting Burlington School Committee v. Department
of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 371 (1985) (emphasis in original)).
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statute directs the court to "grant such relief as [it] determines is
appropriate"' 5 and thereby authorizes the power to order school authorities
to reimburse parents for their expenditures on private special education
for a child if the court determines such placement, rather than the pro-
posed IEP, is proper under the EAHCA. Consequently, placement in private
schools at public expense is permissible under federal legislation where
it is not possible to provide an appropriate education in the public schools.8 6
The State, however, is not required to pay all of the expenses incurred
by parents in educating a child, whether the child is handicapped or non-
handicapped. Furthermore, the state is not required to provide a perfect
education to any child; an appropriate education is not synonymous with
the best possible education."'
In Bales v. Clarke,88 the court held that the state of Virginia must pro-
vide the plaintiff, a handicapped child, with a free appropriate public educa-
tion under the EAHCA.8 9 In Bales, the child's parents sought an ideal
education for their daughter, however, as the court noted:
[Nleither they nor any other parents have the right under the
law to write a prescription for an ideal education for their child
and to have the prescription filled at public expense. The law
requires an appropriate free education. Efforts to build this re-
quirement into something more will threaten the substantial
gains already made in the education of the handicapped. 0
85 See supra note 43. Broad discretion is granted to impartial hearing officers
and to district courts in securing compliance with the law. A hearing officer's discre-
tion has been held to include reimbursing parents for interim placement of a handi-
capped child in an in-state private school. Burlington, 471 U..S. at 359. It has been
suggested that the Burlington holding can logically be extended to apply to out-of-
state placements where no appropriate in-state placements exist. Matta v. Indian
Hill Exempted Village School District, (Indian Hill School District, April 13, 1987)
(Interim Decision, affd in part, rev'd in part). (Copies of both the interim and final
decisions are on file in the Journal office.) Moreover, a hearing officer's discretion
extends to ordering a school district to reimburse parents for private residential
placement of a handicapped child out-of-state during the pendency of the impar-
tial due process hearing procedures and appeals. McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2nd
1527 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Geis v. Board of Educ. of Parisippany-Troy Hills, 774 F.2d
575 (3d Cir. 1985); Hall v. Vance County Bd. of Educ., 774 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1985).
The hearing officer renders a decision in accordance with the rules and regula-
tions. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3323.04-3323.05 (Baldwin 1976); Omo ADMIN.
CODE § 3301-51-02 (1984) and 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.506, 300.509 (1987).
88 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1976 & Supp. 1987); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.132, 300.227,
300.307(b), 300.347 (1988). Although, in such cases, the EAHCA requires that "to
the maximum extent possible, without sacrificing the child's right to an appropriate
education, the handicapped must be educated with the nonhandicapped." 20 U.S.C.
§ 1412(5XB) (1976 & Supp. 1987).8 7 Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, 693 F.2d 41, 42 (8th Cir. 1982), cerL denied,
461 U.S. 927 (1983). The Rowley court held that federal law did not require New
York "to maximize the potential of each handicapped child." 458 U.S. at 200.
88 523 F. Supp. 1366 (E.D. Va. 1981).
0 Under the EAHCA and the Virginia law, the handicapped child failed to prove
that the regional school was inappropriate and that the academy chosen by the
child's parents was appropriate. Id. at 1370.
Id. at 1371.
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A right to an extended school year is supported in Rowley9 1 when
designated in a handicapped child's IEP. In Battle v. Pennsylvania, the court
concluded:
We believe the inflexibility of the defendant's policy of refus-
ing to provide more than 180 days of education to be incompati-
ble with the [EAHCA's] emphasis on the individual. Rather than
ascertaining the reasonable educational needs of each child in
light of reasonable educational goals, the 180 day rule imposes
with rigid certainty a program restriction which may be whol-
ly inappropriate to the child's educational objectives. This the
[EAHCA] will not permit.92
In Yaris v. Special School District,9 the court held that Missouri's policy
of refusing to provide more than 180 days of education for severely handi-
capped children is incompatible with the EAHCA. The state policy pre-
cluded "individualized consideration of and instruction for each child,"
therefore, the court found that the state was failing to provide these
children with "the basic floor of opportunity" embodied in the EAHCA.9 4
91 Rowley, 458 U.S. at 189-90. Some courts have held that the school districts
must extend the duration of instruction for handicapped children beyond 180 days
if a normal school calendar would prevent the proper formulation of educational
goals for handicapped children. See, e.g., Crawford v. Pittman, 708 F.2d 1028, 1035
(5th Cir. 1983) (Mississippi's policy of refusing to consider or provide special educa-
tion programs for longer than 180 days is inconsistent with its obligations under
the EAHCA.); Tilton v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 705 F.2d 800, 804 (6th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984) (transfer from year-round program to 180
day program constituted an impermissible change of placement under the EAHCA).
But cf Stanton v. Board of Educ. of Norwood Cent. School Dist., 581 F. Supp. 190,
194 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (allegation that school board failed to provide special sum-
mer services for handicapped children who required a twelve-month educational
program was actionable under the EAHCA). See generally Note, Application of Penn-
sylvania Department of Education's 180 Day Maximum School Year Policy to Class
of Handicapped Students Exhibiting "Regression-Recoupment" Phenomenon
Violated "Free Appropriate Public Education" Mandate of Education of All Hand-
icapped Children Act of 1975, 54 TEMP. L.Q. 145 (1981) (discussing Battle v. Penn-
sylvania, 629 F.2d 269 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied sub nom. Scanlon v. Battle, 452
U.S. 968 (1981)); Note, Refusal to Provide Mentally Handicapped Children with
More than 180 Days of Education Per Year Violates Right to Appropriate Educa-
tion Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 26 VILL. L. REV. 876
(1981) (Discussing Battle).
92 Battle, 629 F.2d at 280.
93 558 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Mo. 1983), affd, 728 F.2d 1055 (8th Cir. 1984).
4 Id. at 559-60. The court also held that because Missouri receives federal funds
that it distributes to local school districts for the purpose of educating handicapped
children during the summer months, without comparable services for severely hand-
icapped children, the state was also in violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973. Section 504 bans discrimination on the basis of handicap in pro-
grams receiving federal financial assistance. Its requirements were interpreted
by the Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397,
405-07 (1979), a case involving an individual with a severe hearing impairment.
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Other than emphasizing its individualized nature, the Court in Rowley
provided no guidance for determining the adequacy of the benefits re-
quired." In Abrahamson v. Hershman,96 the First Circuit held that the
district court had "ample authority" under the EAHCA to order the place-
ment of a severely retarded boy with "autistic-like" behavior in a residen-
tial program upon finding that he needed residential care with "round-
the-clock training ... in order to make any educational progress. ' 91
VI. Matta v. Indian Hill Exempted Village School District
A recent Interim Decision resulting from an administrative hearing
directly deals with the issue this Note seeks to discuss: Whether or not
Ohio provides autistic children with a free appropriate public education.
In Matta v. Indian Hill Exempted Village School District,9 8 the parents
of an autistic child, Ashish Matta, initiated a due process hearing under
state and federal law.9 Essentially, they were extremely concerned about
their son's total lack of progress during the previous two years of school-
ing under the IEP developed by the Indian Hill Exempted Village School
District (Indian Hill). The Mattas refused to sign the proposed IEP for the
1986-1987 school year prepared by the Indian Hill since it was a virtual
carbon copy of the two earlier unsuccessful IEPs. They had no reason to
believe their son would receive any educational benefit during the upcom-
ing school year.
According to the Mattas, the proposed placement of Ashish was not
appropriate. After no appropriate alternative placements were offered by
Indian Hill, the Mattas placed their son in the Musashino Higashi Gakuen
School (Higashi)"' located in Tokyo, Japan. The Higashi school has a pro-
15 "It is clear that the benefits obtainable by children at one end of the spec-
trum will differ dramatically from those obtainable by children at the other end
with infinite variations in between." Rowley, 458 U.S. at 203.
96 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1983).
97 Id.
98 Matta v. Indian Hill Exempted Village School Dist., (Indian Hill School
District, April 13, 1987).
9 See Ohio Admin. Code § 3301-51-02(G) (1984); 20 U.S.C. § 1414(bX2XA) (1976
& Supp. 1987). See also supra note 42.
10o The Higashi school was founded by Dr. Kiyo Kitahara in 1964 in Tokyo,
Japan. In August of 1987, Dr. Kitahara established the Boston Higashi School
located in Lexington, Massachusetts. Both schools are oriented toward the same
goal: to help autistic children conquer the obstacles they encounter along the road
to social independence. Through education, the children receive an inner sense of
independence, self-confidence, and happiness. BOSTON HIGASHI SCHOOL, PROSPEC-
Tus (1987) available from Boston Higashi School, 2618 Massachusetts Avenue, Lex-
ington, MA 02173; (617) 862-7222. Based upon Dr. Kitahara's many years of ex-
perience as a teacher and principal, she has developed a unique method of educating
autistic children known as Daily Life therapy.
Daily Life Therapy, which emphasizes a strong body via physical activity, helps
autistic children acquire perseverance, emotional stability, and proper rhythm.
It provides these children with a systematic education through "incessant stimula-
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gram specifically designed to educate autistic children offering a wide range
of autistic students the maximum feasible education in the least restric-
tive setting. Since Ashish's placement at Higashi, he has shown progress
for the first time in three years.
The Mattas requested that Indian Hill reimburse them for costs they
incurred resulting from the placement of their son in the Higashi school.
They also requested that Indian Hill assume responsibility for the ongo-
ing costs of Ashish's education. The school district refused to both reim-
burse the Mattas and assume the costs of educating Ashish. Thereafter,
the Mattas sought the protection set forth under both state and federal
statutory provisions, specifically covered by EAHCA's procedural
safeguards. On November 24, 1986, Dr. and Mrs. Matta requested in
writing an impartial due process hearing from the Board of Education of
Indian Hill to resolve the issue of whether an Ohio school district must
assume the cost of private education in Japan of a handicapped child.
Monica R. Bohlen, the hearing officer who made the Interim Decision,
noted that the issue was one of first impression, controlled by both federal
and state law mandating that every handicapped child is entitled to a free
appropriate public education. After addressing the requirements set forth
in the EAHCA, the hearing officer discussed the state specifications gov-
erned by the State Act."10
Indian Hill argued that the federal definition of free appropriate public
education 10 2 suggests a Congressional intent to limit a handicapped child's
educational opportunities to the state of residence .1 0 3 Congressional intent
tion" by the teachers and their peers. Many of their peers are in fact normal children
who represent role models to the autistic children. A primary goal behind Dr.
Kitahara's method is for the autistic children to develop similarly to normal
children, through consistent and concerted growth of knowledge, emotions, and
body. Through the implementation of this method of education, these children begin
to live a more normal life and obtain the capability to develop language and
cognitive abilities. Id.
Daily Life therapy is composed of three essential elements: (1) building physical
strength, (2) stabilizing the emotions, and (3) normalizing the child's intellectual
interest. Id.
During the 1987-1988 school year, eight autistic children from Ohio attended
the Boston Higashi School.
101 The Ohio legislature employed a parallel definition of a free appropriate
public education. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3323.01(d) (Baldwin 1976) provides:
Appropriate public education means special education and related services that:
(1) are provided at public expense and under public supervision,
(2) meet the standards of the state Board of Education,
(3) include an elementary and secondary education and may include
a pre-school education,
(4) are provided in conformity with the individualized education pro-
gram required under this Chapter.
102 See supra note 4.
103 Indian Hills further noted how the term "State," was defined in 20 U.S.C.
§ 1401(a)(bX6) (1976 & Supp. 1987). Indian Hill at 4. Section 1401(6) defines state
as "each of the several States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puer-
to Rico, Guam, American Samoa, the Virgin Islands and the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands."
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concerning the EAHCA and the State Act promotes the necessity of
educating handicapped children within the boundaries of the state,
however, neither the federal nor state legislation specifically provide for,
nor do they prohibit, the placement of children in educational programs
outside of state boarders. Furthermore, Ms. Bohlen commented:
This legislative mandate does not however, limit the options a
state has in providing a handicapped child a free appropriate
public education, nor does it limit the remedies available to a
handicapped child and the parents of a handicapped child who
find that a free appropriate public education is not provided the
child in their school district nor, indeed, elsewhere within the
state boundaries. 1
Furthermore, if the school district's argument pertaining to the inter-
pretation of sections 1401(6)1°5 and 1401(18)10 of the EAHCA were accepted,
the legislation's influence would be ineffective. Ms. Bohlen also pointed out:
If the state failed to provide appropriate education to its handi-
capped students, and there existed no appropriate private educa-
tional program within the state,1 0 7 the parents and children
would have no recourse to enforce the [EAHCA] other than to
seek a due process hearing0 8 and judicial review while the
children continue to be deprived of an appropriate education. 10 9
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a parent's right to
seek interim placement under such circumstances (thereby preventing an
"empty victory") after parents have successfully pursued administrative
and judicial appeals provided for in the EAHCA. 10 Moreover, even though
"the Burlington case involved in-state private placement, the holding can
logically be extended to apply to out-of-state placements when there are
no appropriate in-state placements." '
'0 Matta v. Indian Hill Exempted Village School Dist., (Indian Hill School
District, April 13, 1987) at 5.
105 See supra note 103.
' See supra note 4.
'o7 See supra note 103.
"oi The expense of a due process hearing oftentimes presents a tremendous bar-
rier to parents of handicapped children.
109 Matta v. Indian Hill Exempted Village School Dist., (Indian Hill School
District, April 13, 1987) at 5-6.
110 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 369.
"I Matta v. Indian Hill Exempted Village School Dist., (Indian Hill School
District, April 13, 1987) at 6. Basing its argument on a 1965 Ohio Attorney General
Opinion, Indian Hill School District unsuccessfully asserted that Ohio law did not
permit the payment of tuition to schools or school districts outside the State of Ohio.
Since the Attorney General Opinion pre-dates the enactment of the EAHCA and
the State Act by an excess often years, the opinion is not controlling. The hearing
officer, Ms. Bohlen, stated:
Although Ohio law may not provide for the payment of out of state tui-
tion for handicapped children, this does not shield the state from its
responsibility to provide a free appropriate public education to hand-
icapped children, nor does it limit the authority of the hearing officer
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Procedural safeguards are delineated in both the EAHCA and the State
Act.112 In securing compliance with the law, broad discretion is granted
to impartial hearing officers and the district courts.113 The hearing officer's
discretion has been held to include reimbursing parents for the interim
placement of a handicapped child in an in-state private school.""
In Matta, the hearing officer's discretion extended to reimbursing
parents for the interim placement of a child in an out-of-country school. '
The exercise of such discretion in ordering a school district to reimburse
a parent for private residential placement of a handicapped child out of
state during the pendency of impartial due process and appeals has been
upheld."16 Ms. Bohlen specified that the controlling issue presented in Matta
is "whether [Ohio] is providing a free appropriate public education to the
[autistic] child; [i]f not, then the parents can place their children in an ap-
propriate educational program during the pendency of due process hear-
ings to challenge the state's action.
'1 7
Moreover, whether Indian Hill is relieved of any potential obligation
to reimburse the Mattas for the cost of private education for their son
to fashion a remedy for the State's alleged failure to provide [an autistic
child] with a free appropriate public education that may include an order
to reimburse [the child's] parents for expenditures on private
education....
Id.
112 See supra note 43.
113 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 359. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (Supp. 1989); OHIo
REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.05 (Baldwin 1976); Omo ADmi. CODE § 3301-51-02 (eff.
10-22-84).
A hearing officer shall render a decision in accordance with the rules for special
education adopted by the State Board of Education and federal rules and regula-
tions. Ohio Admin. Code § 3301-51-02 (1984).
114 Burlington, 471 U.S. at 360.
15 The Higashi school has since opened a school in Lexington, Massachusetts
to educate autistic children. See supra note 100.
116 McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Geis v. Board of Educ.
of Parisppany-Troy Hills, 774 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1985); Hall v. Vance County Bd.
of Educ., 774 F.2d 629 (4th Cir. 1985). As noted by the Matta hearing officer, these
cases "do not involve out of country payment, [however] the distinction between
out of country and out of state reimbursement payment is not persuasive. If neither
the state nor the federal legislation specifically provide for the out of state place-
ment of handicapped children, then it really makes [trivial] sense to distinguish
between out of state and out of country placement." Matta v. Indian Hill Exempted
Village School Dist., (Indian Hill School District, April 13, 1987) at 8.
117 The hearing officer stated that:
[Tihe issue [presented by Indian Hill] concerning interstate payment
of tuition may be a moot issue due to the fact that the school can reim-
burse the parents directly within the state, for tuition that the parents
have paid to an educational facility located outside of the state or out-
side of the country. This would seem to avoid any problem with an
asserted prohibition or asserted restriction on a state from paying tui-
tion out of the state.
Matta v. Indian Hill Exempted Village School Dist., (Indian Hill School District,
April 13, 1987) at 9.
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depends upon the facts proven at the impartial due process hearing. Prior
to any order of reimbursement the hearing officer noted that the facts must
affirm a finding that Indian Hill's individualized educational program " 8
for Ashish for the 1986-1987 school year was inappropriate, and that the
Mattas' private placement of their son at the Higashi school was ap-
propriate under the EAHCA.11 9
A criteria to consider in evaluating the appropriateness of the parents'
interim placement is whether this placement is the "least restrictive en-
vironment" for education of this child. This concept is frequently referred
to as "mainstreaming."1 2 "Least restrictive environment" means:
IT]hat, to the maximum extent appropriate, handicapped
children, including children in public or private institutions or
other care facilities, are educated with children who are not
handicapped, and that special classes, separate schooling, or
other removal of handicapped children from the regular educa-
tional environment occurs only when the nature or severity of
the handicapped is such that education in regular classes with
the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved
satisfactorily.1 21
The reasonableness of cost is another factor that has been considered
in deciding the appropriateness of an educational program.1 22
Lastly, the hearing officer stated that:
[In determining the appropriateness of the IEP proposed by In-
dian Hill for the 1986-1987 school year, the standard to be im-
posed is not whether the services provided by the state are suf-
ficient to maximize [the handicapped child's] potential 'commen-
surate with the opportunity provided other children,' but only
to determine whether [the handicapped child] was offered ac-
cess to specialized instruction and related services which were
individually designed to provide some educational benefit to
him. 123
11 See supra note 38.
119 Since the private educational program in Japan is not state certified, the
parents must show that the program at least meets the standards of the Ohio Board
of Education. This has been established as a minimal criteria of an "appropriate"
education in both state and federal legislation. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(aX18) (1989); Omo
REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.01(D) (2) (Baldwin 1988).
120 Springdale School Dist. v. Grace, 494 F. Supp. 266, 273 (W.D. Ark. 1980),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 927 (1983). See supra note 63.
121 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (B) (1989); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.132, 300.550-.556 (1988);
Omo ADMiN. CODE § 3301-51-01 (AA) (eff. 7-1-82).
122 Bales v. Clarke, 523 F. Supp. 1366, 1371 (E.D. Va. 1981). The Burlington
court warned that "parents who unilaterally change their child's placement dur-
ing the pendency of review proceedings, without the consent of state and local school
officials, do so at their own financial risk." 471 U.S. at 373-74; accord Hall, 774
F.2d 629, 633 n.4 (4th Cir. 1985).12
1 Matta v. Indian Hill Exempted School Dist., (Indian Hill Exempted Village
School District, April 13, 1987) at 11-12 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458
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VII. COMPARISON OF STATE LEGISLATION
Before 1971, many state statutes excluded children with certain
physical or mental conditions. 12 4 In 1970, few states had statutes requir-
ing appropriate education for handicapped children. 125 By 1974, forty-six
states had adopted this type of legislation. 26 Some of these laws constituted
sweeping revisions of prior special education statutes and served as models
for the federal EAHCA.
127
The quality of special education varies among states depending upon
the standard mandated in the applicable statutory provision. Some states
incorporate "maximum" capacity language in their statutes.'28 Other states
simply require that special education meet the "needs" of children. 129 Still
others incorporate only miscellaneous expressions as their statutory stan-
dard. 30 Three states specifically include "autistic" in their definition of
handicapped children, exceptional children, or children with special
needs. 3
U.S. 176, 188-89 (1982)). "If it is determined at the hearing that the IEP proposed
by Indian Hill was appropriate, the Mattas would be barred from obtaining reim-
bursement for any interim period in which their child's placement violated Sec-
tion 1415(eX3) [of the EACHA which requires] that a child shall remain in the cur-
rent educational placement during the pendency of due process proceedings unless
the state and parents agree otherwise." Indian Hill at 12 (quoting Burlington, 471
U.S. at 374).
" Beyer, supra note 71, at 367 (citing Comptroller General of the United States,
Disparities Still Exist in Who Gets Special Education (1981)).
1 Id. Two class action suits ignited a change in the educational rights of hand-
icapped children. See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972); Penn-
sylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Commonwealth, 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D.
Pa. 1971), modified, 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (establishing that all children
are entitled to and capable of benefitting from an appropriate public education).
See also Beyer, supra note 124, at 365-66.
M Beyer, supra note 124.
I" See, e.g., 1972 MASS. AcTS 692 (codified as amended at MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 71B (West 1978).
"' See, e.g., ARK. REV. STAT ANN. § 80-2116 (1979) ("to meet the needs and max-
imize the capabilities"); IDAHO CODE § 33-2002 (1981) ("to develop to their fullest
capacity"); MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 71B § 2 (West Supp. 1978) ("to assure the
maximum possible development of a child with special needs").
129 See, e.g., AIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-763 (1981) ("commensurate with their
abilities and needs"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-961 (1979) ("in accord with his or her
abilities and capabilities"); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 157.200(2) (1980) ("to meet the
unique needs"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-24-1 (1981) ("best satisfy the needs").
"I See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-76d(a) (West Supp. 1988) ("suitable");
N. J. STAT. ANN. § 18A 46-13 (West 1966) ("suitable"); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 4402.2
(McKinney 1987) ("suitable"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.450(1) (1979) ("equal educa-
tional opportunity"); P.A. STAT. ANN. tit. 24 § 13-1372 (Purdon Supp. 1987) ("prop-
er"); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 2941 (1968) ("equal educational opportunity").
121 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109 (1987) (definition of children with
special needs); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 13-101 (West 1989) (exceptional children
defined); VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-213 (1985) (definition of handicapped children).
For example, Virginia's legislation provides:
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The Ohio statute defines 'handicapped child' as:
[A] person under twenty-two years of age who is mentally re-
tarded, hard of hearing, deaf, speech impaired, visually handi-
capped, seriously emotionally disturbed, orthopedically im-
paired, multiply impaired, or otherwise health impaired, or who
has specific learning disabilities, and by reason thereof requires
special education."3 2
This definition, unlike several other states, omits "autism" from the
meaning of handicapped child.133 In Ohio, autistic children are grouped
either with the mentally retarded or the seriously emotionally disturbed
educational classifications.134 These classifications, however, do not pro-
vide autistic children with an appropriate education nor with specific fun-
ding to meet their educational needs. Consequently, a significant number
of autistic children are being inadequately served under the Ohio statute.
Few states, however, have actually implemented a statewide plan for the
comprehensive planning for autistic children even though some have
studied the problem extensively and have made recommendations.
In Missouri,'3 5 autistic children attend one of approximately twenty
classes for children with severe behavior disorders. These classes are
located in separate schools for the severely handicapped. The Missouri plan
includes extensive teacher training and consultation and a carefully
planned program of transition to the public schools. Due to the separate
nature of the plan, however, it fails to integrate "mainstreaming" and has
'Handicapped children' means those persons (i) who are aged two to
twenty-one... ,(i) who are mentally retarded, physically handicapped,
seriously emotionally disturbed, speech impaired, hearing impaired,
visually impaired, multiple handicapped, other health impaired in-
cluding autistic or who have a specific learning disability or who are
otherwise handicapped as defined by the Board of Education and (iii)
who because of such impairments need special education.
V.A. CODE ANN. § 22.1-213(1) (1985) (emphasis added).
North Carolina's statute provides:
The term 'children with special needs' includes, without limitation, all
children from age five through age 20 who because of permanent or
temporary mental, physical or emotional handicaps need special educa-
tion, are unable to have all their needs met in a regular class without
special education or related services, or are unable to be adequately
educated in the public schools. It includes those who are mentally
retarded, epileptic, learning disabled, cerebral palsied, seriously emo-
tionally disturbed, orthopedically impaired, autistic, multiply handi-
capped, pregnant, hearing-impaired, speech-impaired, blind or visual-
ly impaired, other health impaired and academically gifted.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C-109 (1987) (emphasis added).
132 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.01(A) (Baldwin 1988).
133 See supra note 135.
'a See supra notes 29, 31.
"s Missouri defines handicapped children as "the speech defective, the crip-
pled, the educable mentally retarded, and the blind or partially sighted and deaf
or hard of hearing children who do not attend the state school for the deaf or the
state school for the blind." Mo. ANN. STAT. § 178.260(1) (Vernon 1965).
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brought the threat of litigation for failure to comply with the EAHCA.' 6
The Department of Mental Health-Mental Retardation in South
Carolina"" operates regional centers which provide extensive services to
autistic children, many of whom are extremely difficult to manage. 138
Moreover, good coordination with the Department of Education exists and
the state has contracted with the Judevine Center in St. Louis for inten-
sive teacher training. Nevertheless, South Carolina needs to advance
toward the establishment of services in the local public schools.
North Carolina'39 hosts the oldest statewide, public school-based pro-
gram for autistic children. The program is operated through a cooperative
arrangement between the Department of Public Instruction and Division
TEACCH (Treatment and Education of Autistic and Related Communica-
tion Handicapped Children) of the Department Psychiatry at the Univer-
sity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 140 Excellent support exists at the
state level, and the connection with the University contributes an exper-
tise in research and evaluation.
North Carolina's National Society for Adults and Children with Autism
(NSAC) has been instrumental in promoting the needs of the autistic. After
establishing a NSAC Chapter group home, the North Carolina NSAC
Chapter has obtained a statewide system of public school classrooms,
secured a statewide network for the treatment and education of autistic
people, and acquired a state autism office.' 4' North Carolina has a single
strong state NSAC Chapter that has worked with both the state legislature
and state government agencies to increase the visibility of autism ad-
vocating with one voice to meet the needs of North Carolina's autistic in-
dividuals.142
136 J.G. Olley, Organization of Educational Services for Autistic Children and
Youth, in CRrITCAL ISSUES, supra note 24, at 21.
117 South Carolina's Special Education for Handicapped Children statute defines
Handicapped Children as:
[Tihose who deviate from the normal either psychologically or
physiologically to such an extent that special classes, special facilities,
or special services are needed for their maximum development, in-
cluding educable mentally handicapped, trainable mentally handi-
capped, emotionally handicapped, hearing handicapped, visually handi-
capped, orthopedically handicapped, speech handicapped and those
handicapped by learning disabilities ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-33-20 (Law. Co-op. 1977).
... CRrTCAL ISSUES, supra note 24, at 21.
139 Id.
I In 1986, more than 60 self-contained, public school classes for autistic children
were located throughout North Carolina. In order to receive initial training, in-
service training, classroom consultation, administrative consultation, and a year-
ly reevaluation of each child through one of the six regional TEACCH centers,
(Treatment and Education of Autistic and Related Communication Handicapped
Children), 28 of the public school classes contracted with the Division TEACCH.
These services are funded directly from the state legislature and from Title VI-B
funds allocated to local school systems. Jeffries, Services For Individuals with
Autisn: How Do We Get From Nowhere to Somewhere? 18 ADVOCATE 8-9 (1986).
141 Id.
142 Id.
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North Carolina's work with autism dates back to 1960, when the School
of Medicine at the University of North Carolina in Chapel Hill first began
to see children with autism. In 1966, the Child Research Project, founded
by Dr. Eric Schopler was funded by a health grant from the National In-
stitute of Mental Health. In 1970, the North Carolina society for Autistic
Children (now the North Carolina Society for Autistic Adults and Children
was incorporated and immediately pursued funding for the Child Research
Project to stabilize and expand it. In 1971, legislation mandating the crea-
tion of Division TEACCH the United States's first statewide community-
based program for the treatment of children with autism and similar
developmental disorders.143
VIII. CONCLUSION
To learn, autistic children require specialized education. Behavior
therapists have demonstrated that autistic children can learn through
structured and active programming.'" A structured educational approach
emphasizing the curricular content areas of communication, cognition and
social development is generally recommended. 4 '
Autistic children are entitled to receive a free appropriate public educa-
tion. Many states throughout the country, including Ohio, do not provide
the necessary safeguards to ensure that autistic children receive a free
appropriate public education.
143 The North Carolina Society expanded educational opportunities available
to autistic individuals. Since 1972, the North Carolina Society has run a pro-
grammed, residential summer camp "to broaden the lives of autistic children and
adults and to offer respite for their parents. Id. at 9. The camp is paid for by a
combination of state funds, contributions, and sliding scale fees from parents. Id.
The North Carolina Society established the first group home in North Carolina
in 1976, the Triad Home for Autistic Youth, to serve severely behavior-disordered,
autistic adolescents. The home was the United States' first community-based group
home for autistic individuals. As of 1986, North Carolina has seven additional
homes - one for moderately to severely affected children, five for moderately to
severely affected adults, one for severely affected adults, and one for high func-
tioning adults capable of competitive employment. Three more homes are scheduled
to open by 1991. Id.
After many years of work with legislators and state government agencies on
the part of the North Carolina Society, the North Carolina legislature passed an
omnibus bill in 1985. The bill, part of the governor's expansion budget, appropriated
money to begin a sixth regional TEACCH center, to set up three new group homes
for autistic individuals, and to begin a community living training program for per-
sons with autism, which would become a part of North Carolina's continuum of
services for people with developmental disabilities. Id. Established in conjunction
with Division TEACCH, the community program serves as a model to conduct
research into what works best for persons with autism, to train graduate and
undergraduate students who desire to work with autistic and other related
developmental disabilities, and to help autistic persons of all functional levels to
achieve their fullest potential. Id.
144 Handleman, A Glimpse at Current Trends in the Education of Autistic
Children, 9 BEHAv. THERAPIsT 137-39 (1986).
145 Id.
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This author concludes that Ohio does not have a suitable response for
providing a free appropriate public education to its autistic children.
Autism presents a host of difficult problems for the educator, specifically,
how to educate a child who is withdrawn, isolated, and often temperamen-
tal. Educational programs available in Ohio do not provide an appropriate
environment to effectively teach autistic children to reach their true
potential.
To effectively address this issue, Ohio should begin by amending the
current state statute14 to include "autism" as a separate category in its
definition of "handicapped child. ' 147 The establishment of a distinct
classification is necessary to facilitate appropriate educational planning,
to allocate funds for services to autistic individuals and to provide autistic
children free appropriate public education throughout the state. Further-
more, the stigma associated with the emotionally disturbed would be
removed, thereby freeing autistic children of an untrue and unnecessary
stereotype.
141 OHo REV. CODE ANN. § 3323.01(A).
147 See supra note 135.
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